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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether banks that sell loans in the secondary market respond
differently to a monetary policy innovation from those that do not engage in loan sales.
We answer this question by measuring the policy response while controlling for loan sales
activities. Using a simple theoretical model and U.S. bank-level Call Report longitudinal
data for the period 1991Q1-2008 Q4, we conduct a dynamic panel regression analysis.
We find that the long-run response to a typical policy shock is three times greater for mid-
size banks engaging in loan sales. Given the increase in proportion of banks engaging in
loan sales, this finding has strong implications for policy makers and bank industry
volatility.
Keywords: Securitization; loan sales; monetary policy; bank lending channel; dynamic panel
regression.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates how off-balance sheet bank activities affect the transmission of
monetary policy, in particular, the bank lending channel. Since deregulation of the banking
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sector, improvements in data-processing and telecommunications, and the implicit subsidies
from Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s), banks have increasingly changed their
business model of “originate and hold” loans to “originate and sell” by participating in off-
balance sheet activities such as securitizing mortgage assets and loan sales. The growth in
this area of bank activity has been unprecedented, which raises the question of how the
efficacy of the bank lending channel has changed over time following this growth of
securitization. Securitization has clearly affected credit markets by transforming otherwise
illiquid assets into liquid, tradable securities. Increasingly banks are using loan sales to
finance their lending, with over 50% of mortgage loans being sold and the funds recirculated
within the lending institution [1]. Given that loan sale activity varies across banks, monetary
policy effects may also vary across banks for this reason. This paper examines the types of
banks that have been most engaged in securitization and their behavior under stimulus or
contraction of monetary policy. Results indicate that medium sized banks engaged in loan
sales are two to three times more sensitive to monetary contraction relative to non-selling
banks.
1.1 Literature Review: Loan Sales and the Transmission of Monetary Policy
There are several channels of monetary policy transmission to the real side of the economy.
Two channels are of particular interest here; the interest rate channel and the bank lending
channel. The interest rate channel operates through prices; specifically, the response of
investment demand to changes in interest rates following an open market sale of securities
by the central bank [2,3,4]. When bank reserves fall relative to deposits, banks must reduce
deposit holdings causing nominal and real interest rates to rise. Likewise, it is argued that
the decline in deposits comes also through the increase in their opportunity cost with respect
to other risk-free assets [5]1. As the opportunity cost of investment increases, investment
declines and subsequently real economic activity falls. The supply of bank loans is irrelevant
to the interest rate channel since firms who borrowed from banks before the monetary
contraction can still borrow in the bond or commercial paper market. That is, bank loans and
other forms of credit are assumed perfect substitutes.
Unlike the interest rate channel, the bank lending channel operates on the asset side of
banks’ balance sheets; a monetary contraction causes the supply of bank loans to fall (see,
for example: [6,7,8]). Following a monetary contraction, banks must alter their asset
composition.  Banks have several options to deal with a policy induced decline in bank
reserves; by acquiring non-reservable loanable funds, such as CD’s or by decreasing their
holdings of securities.  If banks are unable to shield their loan supply by costlessly
substituting non-reservable liabilities for reservable deposits, or decreasing securities, then
banks reduce their loans2. Kashyap and Stein [7] argued that an open market saleof
securities by the Fed increases the bank’s cost of funds causing the supply of loans to shift
leftwards. Further, during monetary contraction asymmetric information worsens and banks
become more cautious when lending funds.
In order for the lending channel to propagate and amplify the effects of monetary policy, two
events must occur: first, banks must reduce the availability of credit to borrowers; and
1See [5] for example.  Households substitute bonds for deposits.  A rising nominal interest rate results in higher real
rates due to price stickiness in the economy.
2The liability side of the balance sheet may absorb a portion of the monetary contraction, as larger banks have the
option of issuing uninsured CDs or bonds an compensate for the drop in deposits [9].
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second, bank dependent borrowers must not be able to find alternate sources of funding.
When denied bank credit, these borrowers will reduce investment, employment and output.
Asset size has been shown repeatedly to be a crucial determinant of bank behavior.
Kashyap and Stein [7,10] found that the lending channel operates primarily through small,
liquidity constrained banks because these banks would have more difficulty raising non-
reservable liabilities compared to large banks. Kishan and Opiela [11] found that small,
poorly capitalized banks are more responsive to monetary contraction compared to large,
well-capitalized banks. Consequently, small banks are more likely to reduce loan supply in
response to a reduction in reserves. DeYoung and Duffy [12] argued that the changes
occurring in the banking industry tend to benefit larger banks rather than smaller banks.
Another important difference in the bank operation across size categories is in the volatility
of loan returns. Corbae and D’Erasmo [13] pointed out that small banks experience greater
loan return volatility, which leads to endogenous adjustment of the balance sheet, with a
greater reliance on securities to account for this greater risk.
1.2 The Development of Loan Sales and Securitization
Traditionally, a bank originates (issues) a loan which it holds on its balance sheet until
maturity. Increasingly, banks are deviating from this “traditional” behavior and selling loans
on their balance sheet, in part or in entirety, to other institutions. A bank may want to remove
loans from its balance sheet for a variety of reasons, such as; meeting liquidity requirements,
reducing risk-based capital requirements, or to simply reduce the overall costs of servicing
and financing loans. Banks can manage their risk exposure by selling risky, leveraged loans.
In fact, Drucker and Puri [14] found that it is the risky, leveraged, loans that are most
commonly sold in the secondary loan market. Another reason banks sell loans is to diversify
their loan portfolio, which reduces risk. Demestz [15] argued that banks also engage in loan
selling because they have a comparative advantage in originating loans and other banks
buying loans have a comparative advantage in funding those loans. Banks with extensive
branching and access to diversified loan originations are less likely to engage in loan sales
or purchases. Demsetz [15] also found that banks with strong reputations or banks
belonging to bank holding companies are more likely to enter into the secondary loan market
suggesting a “reputational” barrier to market entry.
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Fig. 1.  Loans held for sale as a proportion of total loans, by bank size
Source: Call Reports FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041.
As Fig. 1 above indicates, banks with assets in excess of $500 million are more likely to
engage in loans sales as a proportion of total loans. This finding is consistent with Demsetz
[15] that larger banks have greater access to the secondary loan market.
According to [14], banks remove loans from their balance sheet through loan sales,
syndication, and/or asset securitization. The data suggests that loan sales are typically
anticipated by the bank at origination since 60 percent are sold within one month of
origination and 90 percent are sold within one year. These loans are typically sold to non-
banks such as pension funds, investment banks, finance companies, etc. Usually these
loans have tighter restrictive covenants tied to the firm’s financial data. These covenants
mitigate the costs associated with adverse selection and moral hazard making the loan more
liquid in the secondary market [14].3 With loan syndication, the lead bank negotiates the
terms of the loan with the borrower and manages the loan. The lead bank then sells pieces
of the loan to participant banks at origination; consequently participant banks essentially
fund fractions of the loan without being involved in the daily maintenance of the loan. As with
securitized loans, the secondary market for syndicated loans has boomed. According to [14],
US non-financial firms raised $1.5 trillion in loan syndications in 2005. The secondary loan
sales market grew from $8 billion in 1991 to $176.3 billion in 2005.  Loan syndication differs
from securitization by the size of the loan: syndicated loans involve large loan sizes but
securitization involves many small sized loans [16].
A bank securitizes an asset by pooling similar financial assets (based on term, structure, and
credit characteristics) into asset-backed tradable securities to be sold on the secondary
3 Typical loan covenants include the borrower maintaining a minimum net worth, not exceeding maximum leverage
ratio or restrictions on dividend payments. Additional covenants may include that proceed from equity or sales be
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market. The cash-flow generated by the repayment of the principal and/or interest from
those assets provides the return to the investor buying the security. Securitization also
allows banks or any financial institution to convert otherwise illiquid assets such as
mortgages into liquid, tradable assets.
The market for mortgage- backed securities (MBS) developed in the 1970’s following the
establishment of the government sponsored enterprises (GSE), Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Fannie Mae was originally
created to provide mortgages for low to middle income households. Freddie Mac was
established to provide liquidity for the residential mortgage market. These agencies do not
originate loans but purchase pooled mortgages from banks in the primary market and issue
and guarantee securities in the secondary market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantee
timely payments on the security for a fee of 20 basis points on the principal. In order for the
mortgage to be included in the pool of loans for the GSE’s, the mortgage must meet certain
criteria. In 1980 the residential mortgage market consisted of $1.1 trillion in obligations of
which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held or securitized 7%. By 2003 the mortgage market
expanded to $7.7 trillion of which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held or securitized 47%
[17].Since 1980, the secondary market expanded to other asset-backed securities (ABS)
such as automobile loans, commercial loans, credit card receivables, boat loans, etc. It is not
surprising that the secondary market for loans sales has exploded following the
establishment of these GSE’s since these agencies are responsible for lowering the cost of
securitizing assets.
Fig. 2. Proportions of US banks with non-zero net gains from loan sales
Source: Call Reports FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041.
As Fig. 2 indicates, the proportion of banks engaged in loan sales increased steadily during
the 1990’s. Selling loans became popular because it was profitable to do so and because of
an increase in the ease with which banks could sell loans to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
Fig. 3 below shows that the ratio of the net gain from loan sales to non-interest income
increased rapidly from 2000 to 2004 for all bank asset sizes. However, the sharpest rise
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gain from loan sales relative to non-interest income declines sharply from 2007 following the
sub-prime mortgage credit crunch.
Fig. 3.  Net gain from loan sales as percent of all non-interest income, by bank size
Source: Call Reports FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041.
1.3 Loan Sales and the Bank Lending Channel
It is unarguable that banks play a special role in the economy. Many small to medium sized
firms rely on bank credit because they cannot raise funds externally in capital markets or
because asymmetric information makes raising external funds more costly. An important
question is how monetary policy is transmitted via the bank lending channel to the economy
given the change in the banking business model. Pennacchi [18] stated that loan sales allow
some banks to finance some loans less expensively than other traditional means such as
deposits or issuing equity simply because banks can avoid the costs associated with holding
additional required reserves or capital. Strahan[16] further argued that deposits have
become less important as a source of bank funds for lending to small to medium sized firms.
There has been a fundamental shift in the way in which banks operate from funding illiquid
loans with liquid deposits, to offering cash on demand through credit enhancement, by
transforming illiquid assets into liquid, off-balance sheet loans. Further, banks are able to
fund risky loans using the proceeds from loan sales even if the bank’s risk-based capital
requirements are low since banks can simply sell the risky loans [14]. Given that deposits
are becoming less important as a source of funding for banks, one may suspect that this
would weaken the effects of the bank lending channel transmission of monetary policy. Loan
sales help relax the funding constraints banks face by allowing banks to raise funds and
share credit risk with other non-banks.4 The bank lending channel hinges on the assumption
that some banks cannot replace a decline in deposits and reserves by simply issuing other
non-reservable liabilities such as CD’s or equity, so the market supply of credit falls.
However, in the event of a monetary contraction, and a subsequent fall in reserves and
deposits, banks can sell existing loans to fund additional loans potentially maintaining the
supply of credit. If however, the secondary market for loan sales or securitized assets
4Drucker and Puri [14] argued that the majority of loans purchased are by non-bank institutions which do not
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freezes, as in 2008 to 2011, the bank lending channel of policy transmission will become
stronger as banks lose their capacity to sell loans when the secondary loan sales market
becomes less liquid.
Using annual bank-level data from 1999-2005 for Euro Area banks, Altunbas, Gambacorta
and Marques [19] found that securitization reduces the effectiveness of the bank lending
channel. However, their result is heavily dependent on the business cycle. During business
cycle up-swings the effect is stronger compared to cycle down-swings.  Also, they find that
monetary contractions have a greater effect on banks with risky credit portfolios, as
measured by loan loss provisions and expected default frequency. Two key concerns are
that the data in their study only covers one business cycle, and that the observations are
annual which may obscure some of the banks responses to a monetary contraction. An
additional concern is that securitization has been increasing and only began to decline
recently which does not provide much variability during the 1999-2005 periods.
Using a “securitizability index” constructed across banks over time, which measures the
potential level of securitization, [20] showed that securitization acts as a substitute for
traditional liquid funds on banks’ balance sheets. Loutskina [20] then showed that rising
potential securitization activity is associated with a smaller response to exogenous cost of
funds shocks.
Using US bank balance sheet data from the Call Reports, this paper examines how the
growth of actual loan sales affects a bank’s loan response to monetary contractions. This
dataset is quarterly and spans two and a half decades, with a regression sample which
spans the period 1994:Q1 to 2008:Q4.
Hobijn and Ravenna [21] developed a DSGE monetary transmission model that introduces
loan sales and securitization, with a focus on the impact of market distortions due to
encouraging sub-prime lending. While interesting, the underlying question of how loan sales
in general impact the efficacy of policy is not addressed.5
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 A Bank Behavior Model with Loan Sales
In order to establish how a change in bank level participation in loan sales will alter the
strength of the bank lending channel, a variation of the Klein-Monti model is employed,
which provides an industrial organization approach to bank behavior. The basis of the model
is the constrained profit maximization problem of an individual banking firm in a duopoly
setting. Each of the two banks are assumed to have only two assets, Loans (Li ), and
Reserves (Ri). Demand Deposits (Di) are the only liability.
The balance sheet constraint requires that the stock of total assets must equal the stock of
total liabilities at each point in time for bank i:
iii DLR )1(
5Many recent studies have examined the determinants of banks’ securitization decisions, as well as efficiency
implications of this activity, without linking the process to policy. See, for example [22,23].
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Total Reserves (Ri) are held as cash (Ci) or as a net position on the inter-bank market (Mi).
iii MCR )2(
The interest rate on the inter-bank market, r, the Federal Funds rate, is exogenous to the
bank.  It is also assumed that banks hold only the minimum required reserves as cash:
ii DC )3(
Where the minimum reserve requirement ratio, , is set by central bank policy and is
exogenous to the bank.
To introduce loans sales, assume that there is a fraction, λi of loans that are sold to provide
liquidity. The parameter λi will vary depending on how active bank i is in the secondary
market for loans and securitized assets, where λi is exogenous for simplicity. Exogeneity is
not an unreasonable assumption as Demsetz [15] showed there are participation barriers to
entry in the secondary loans market. The purpose of this paper is not to examine why banks
do or do not participate in the secondary loan market, but rather given participation, how the
lending response of banks differs. While this parameter will fluctuate over the financial cycle
for a given bank, the disparity in participation across banks is assumed constant.
The bank loses a fixed percentage (1-c) of sold loans to liquidation costs, such that the total
revenue to the bank from loan sales is cλiLi where c is exogenous and 0<c<1.6
A bank will have a positive position on the inter-bank market when it is a net lender of funds
for the period, and this will occur when “on balance sheet” loans (1-λi)Li are less than excess
reserves.
iiiiii LcLDM   )1()1()4(
The inverse deposit supply function is assumed to be convex and continuously differentiable.
The market deposit interest rate is a function of total industry deposits D, where in the
duopoly case D = D1+D2.
0)('such that)()5( D DrDr D
The inverse loan demand function facing the bank is such that the market loan rate is a
function of total industry loans L, where L = L1+L2.
0''and0)('such that)()6(  LLL rLrLr
Bank i faces a cost function for the production of loans and deposits, which is assumed to be
separable and increasing in both loan and deposit output. In addition, I assume that the
function is non-linear and continuously differentiable such that
6The parameter c represents “iceberg” costs and does not include other benefits such as loan diversification.




















γ1 represents the slope of the marginal cost curve of loan production for bank 1. As γ1
increases, the elasticity of loan supply increases and bank 1 is less efficient. Technically γi is
a function of λi, however [24] showed that a more efficient bank with a lower gamma has a
larger negative loan response to rise in interest rates. In this study, the goal is to examine,
for a given cost, how banks engaging in loan sales would respond to a change in monetary
policy. The bank’s decision problem is to maximize profits:
  ),(1),(max)8( iiiiDiiiLiii DLTCDrrMLrDL  
Substituting (4) for Mi in (8) yields:
),())1(()1)((),(max)9( iiiiDiiiiLiii DLTCDrrLrcLrrDL  









Differentiating (10) with respect to r for banks 1 and 2:
   




















































Where (11) is the reaction function for bank 1, and (12) is the reaction function for bank 2.
For simplicity, but without loss of generalization, set 2 = 0, meaning that bank 2 does not









 1 gives the policy response for bank 1




















Equation (13) is negative if 1 < (1/(1+c)).  In Fig. 1 we show that on average 1 is at most
3% and so even in the extreme case that there are no liquidation costs resulting in a c=1, 1
would have to be less than 1/2.  In addition, if we assume a linear loan demand function so
that rL"=0, 1< 1/3 for equation (13) to be negative.   Equation (13) tells us that an increase in
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the Federal Funds rate results in a decline in the quantity of loans.  The effect of a change in





















The sign of this term depends on the value of 1 relative to c7, such that for banks with a
small exposure to loan sales, this term will be positive.  This indicates that, for these banks,
having access to the secondary loan market will reduce the response of lending to policy




 1 less negative). This result is consistent
with the notion of banks using loan sales as a buffer against liquidity shocks.
As the value of 1 increases beyond a tipping point, the second derivative of policy response
turns negative. Banks with a large exposure to loan sales will actually experience an
increased drop in loans on the balance sheet in response to a monetary contraction. In
addition, bank level optimal policy response grows as 1increases.
This model, while a simple representation of bank behavior, provides an intuitive testable
hypothesis: as loan sale activity increases across banks and over time, the magnitude of
lending reduction in response to rising Federal Funds rate will increase, all else constant.
Now I turn to specifying a model to test this prediction in US banks.
2.2 Empirical Methodology and Results
2.2.1 Descriptive statistics and data definitions
Bank balance sheet data are taken from quarterly consolidated bank Call Reports available
from the Federal Reserve. Banks are divided by real total asset size, since it has already
been established that larger banks have a smaller loan response to monetary policy shocks
[7,10]. The following categories are used here: small banks with total assets below $100
million; lower-medium sized banks with total assets between the $100 million-$300 million;
upper-medium sized banks with total assets between the $300 million-$500 million; and
large banks with total assets greater than $500 million. Loans are transferred to a "held-for-
sale" account, when the bank intends to sell, securitize or syndicate a loan.  Loans held for
sale are recorded at the market value as of the balance sheet date.
Tables 1A and 1B below present the descriptive statistics by bank size and participation in
loan sales pertaining to this analysis. The descriptive statistics are a snap shot of the
banking industry for the beginning and end of the regression sample, 1994:Q1 and 2008:Q4,
to glean a quick understanding of how the industry has changed over time. S=1 refers to
banks with non-zero values for “loans held for sale”. Table 1A presents the bank data from
1994:Q1 and Table 1B presents the same summary statistics for the fourth quarter of 2008.
7Second derivative will be negative when > . .
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Table 1A. Descriptive Statitistics1994Q4, S=0 and S=1 for non-selling and selling
banks, respectively
Table 1B. Descriptive Statitistics 2008Q4, S=0 and S=1 for non-selling and selling
banks, respectively
Several patterns emerge from the data for 1994 and 2008. First, with the exception of the
largest banks in the $500 million plus asset category, selling banks (S = 1) hold fewer
securities compared to non-selling banks (S = 0) in all size categories. This observation is
expected (and consistent with [20]) since if selling banks require liquidity, they can simply
sell loans to acquire funds. Non-selling banks, unable to sell loans, will have to sell securities
instead to gain liquidity. Second, the loan to asset ratio is generally higher for selling banks
compared to non-selling banks. Again, selling banks can hold more loans on the balance
sheet when those loans are liquid in the secondary loan sales market. Third, the equity to
asset ratio is lower for selling banks compared to non-selling banks. Fourth, non-interest
income as a fraction of operating income is higher for selling banks compared to non-selling
banks. In general, smaller banks tend to hold more equity as a fraction of total assets
compared to large banks. In addition, non-selling small banks have a higher securities-to-
assets ratio compared to larger banks. Again, the descriptive statistics are consistent with
[10] in that small banks hold more liquidity on their balance sheet compared to large banks,
however, this is especially true for non-selling banks.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Response of Loan Sales to Policy
For a given bank size, this study tests whether loan response to a change in the Federal
Funds rate decreases as loan sales increase. Following [25] and others, the Federal Funds
rate (FFR) is used as an indicator of monetary policy innovations.  The data spans from the
first quarter in 1991 to the first quarter in 2007 to account for bank-specific differences that
persist throughout the sample. Observations beyond 2007Q1 are omitted to avoid the
confounding effects of the financial crisis. The study only includes banks that appear in the
Size Category S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1
(real assets)
All Sizes 9579 1690 0.099 0.086 0.102 0.143 0.529 0.604 0.335 0.278
<=$100m 8165 811 0.101 0.089 0.098 0.134 0.524 0.593 0.343 0.283
$100m-300m 1104 479 0.091 0.086 0.114 0.129 0.558 0.611 0.315 0.287
$300m-500m 193 111 0.091 0.082 0.131 0.146 0.557 0.627 0.275 0.276
$500m plus 322 289 0.087 0.079 0.170 0.191 0.538 0.612 0.240 0.252
Table 1A: Descriptive Statitistics 1994Q1, S=0 and S=1 for non-selling and selling banks, respectively
Obs Equity/Assets Nonintinc/Op. Inc Loans/Assets Securities/Assets
Size Category S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1 S=0 S=1
(real assets)
All Sizes 5871 1621 0.117 0.098 0.097 0.135 0.654 0.724 0.204 0.172
<=$100m 4237 506 0.123 0.102 0.092 0.126 0.642 0.719 0.214 0.164
$100m-300m 1205 578 0.100 0.096 0.097 0.121 0.708 0.728 0.196 0.171
$300m-500m 206 202 0.106 0.093 0.104 0.132 0.681 0.744 0.194 0.172
$500m plus 223 335 0.112 0.098 0.156 0.161 0.579 0.714 0.144 0.167
Table 1B: Descriptive Statitistics 2008Q4, S=0 and S=1 for non-selling and selling banks, respectively
Obs Equity/Assets Nonintinc/Op. inc. Loans/Assets Securities/Assets
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sample for at least 50 consecutive quarters in order to limit the examination to banks that are
in existence through at least one complete business cycle.  This also mitigates the effect of
mergers and acquisitions among banks.
To examine the relationship between loan sales and the Federal Funds rate (FFR),
Regression 1 below is estimated, with loans held for sale (HELD) as the dependent variable.
A pooled OLS estimation in first differences is utilized, which eliminates bank specific time-
invariant heterogeneity, and any inconsistency that may result.  First differences also ensure






































A contemporaneous and lagged differenced Federal Funds rate (∆FFR) is included to
capture the dynamic nature of monetary policy, and unemployment and regional housing
prices (Housing CPI and Housing CPI interacted with a bank's state code) to partial-out
demand-side effects.8 Bank specific cluster robust standard errors are reported, correcting
test statistics for correlation among error terms over time for each bank. Below in Tables 2A
and 2B are the results for Regression 1. For simplicity, only the variables of interest, the
coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged Federal Funds rate, are reported.
Table 2A.Dynamic panel first difference OLS estimates for regression Equation 1,
dependent variable is “loans held for sale”
Size “Small” “Lower medium” “Upper medium” “Large”


























Mean Loans Held 1,730.7 4,348.24 7,837.97 373,068.2
Growth Rate
Effect
-0.018 -0.161 -0.175 -0.148
N 273,418 58,688 9,200 15,708
No. Banks 6,466 2,315 708 683
R2 0.022 0.101 0.068 0.055
***, **, * refers to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Size categories based on real total assets.  Mean Loans held for sale is for “selling banks” in $000’s.
Growth rate effect is calculated as the sum of coefficients on FFRt terms divided by mean.
8The Housing CPI is available from Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED).
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Table 2B shows results from an instrumental variable estimation of the dynamic first
difference panel in the Regression 1 equation above. In order to avoid potential endogeneity
bias due to correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error, the
autoregressive term is instrumented by its second lag (Anderson and Hsiao [26]).The
Hansen and Sargan over-identification test shows that the second lag is, in fact, exogenous.
In addition, White robust standard errors are used in each regression to account for
heteroskedasticity.
Table 2B. Dynamic panel IV estimates for regression Equation1, dependent variable is
“loans held for sale”
Size “Small” “Lower medium” “Upper medium” “Large”





































Root MSE 741.97 5633.5 9899.8 5.8e+05
Note: factor interaction terms between state code and housing prices are omitted from the IV model.
Specification is otherwise identical to that in table 2A and shown in Regression 1 equation.
***, **, * refers to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
Further robustness of results is achieved by accounting for the censored nature of the
dependent variable, the change in loans held for sale, which takes on a value of zero in 83%
of observations across all size categories. This scenario has been shown to lead to
meaningful inconsistency in OLS coefficient estimates in some instances (see Tobin [27]
etc.). Table 2C below shows MLE Tobit coefficients for the Regression Equation (1)
specification.
The primary result is consistent and robust to specification: the coefficient on the
contemporaneous FFR is negative and significant and the coefficient on the lagged FFR
is positive and significant for each bank size category, including the largest banks. The
coefficients increase in absolute value the larger the bank, indicating a larger dollar value
response to a given policy shock. An interpretation is that following a monetary contraction
(increase in FFR), loans held for sale initially fall as banks reduce their inventory of loan
sales for liquidity to buffer the policy induced decline in reserves. The following quarter,
loans held for sale begin to rise as banks rebuild their loan sales inventory.9
9A positive change in loans held for sale indicate that banks are more than replacing their account loans "held for
sale".  A negative change loans held indicates that banks are not replacing loans sold with new loans "held for
sale".  It cannot ascertained whether or not a "no change" in loans held is due to loans being sold and replaced one-
for- one or due to inactivity banks in that account.
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Table 2C. Tobit estimation of regression Equation (1), dependent variable is “loans
held for sale”
Size “Small” “Lower medium” “Upper medium” “Large”


























N 273,418 58,688 9,200 15,708
% obs. censored 91.3% 69.0% 54.4% 49.1%
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0135 0.0124 0.0092 0.0057
Note: P-values calculated using cluster robust standard errors.
***, **, * refers to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
The five-quarter long-run dynamic multiplier, calculated as the sum of the coefficients on the
contemporary and four lags of FFR, is negative and significant in each case. A sense of the
magnitude implied is seen in the long run “growth rate effect” calculated in Table 2A. This
indicates that the cumulative impact of a 100 basis point increase in the Federal Funds rate
over 5 quarters would be a reduction in the growth of loans held for sale between 1.8% and
17%, based on size, for banks that are engaged in loan sales. Thus, the net effect of a
monetary contraction is an aggregate reduction in loan sale activity across banks. The
results thus far are consistent with the idea that banks use loan sales as a liquidity buffer
against monetary contractions.
Clearly, the magnitudes of the coefficients and long-run multiplier, and thus implied growth
rate effects, are sensitive to specification, however, the signs and significance are
consistent. The largest change comes in the Tobit specification, with magnitudes of the long
run multiplier estimates increasing for all size categories. This likely reflects censoring bias in
the dynamic panel and IV models.
3.2 The Role of Loan Sales in Total Lending Policy Response
Recall, to test the theoretical model that banks selling loans (1 > 0) have a larger response
in loans to a change in monetary policy (FFR), the estimated coefficients should have a










. The first derivative states
that as the FFR rises, loans fall. The interpretation of the second derivative is that banks
engaging more in loan sales should have a more negative first derivative, i.e. a larger drop in
loans following a monetary contraction as banks sell loans to gain liquidity.  An interaction
term, ΔHELD*ΔFFR, is used to capture the prediction from equation (14). In order to capture
the long-run dynamic nature of the policy response, four lags of the change in FFR are used,
as well as two lags of the interaction term. Three quarterly dummy variables,
contemporaneous and multiple lags in unemployment and housing inflation, multiple lags of
the log difference in M2 and savings deposits to control for demand side effects and the
business cycle, and multiple lags of the dependent variable total loans to control for the
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autoregressive nature of loans are also included10. To capture regional business cycle
effects the bank’s state code is interacted with unemployment, housing inflation and M2.11
Also included as independent variables are the lagged log-difference in total assets, equity,








































































































































Again, since pooled OLS in first differences is used, the fixed effects are not estimated.  Of
particular interest is the interaction between loans held for sale and the policy variable,
ΔHELD*ΔFFR. As mentioned above, it should be negative and significant, especially for
banks that sell loans following an increase in the Federal Funds rate. The OLS coefficient
estimates for the variables of interest are reported in Table 3A below.
10 M2 includes savings deposits at the aggregate level.  No one bank however will have an influence on M2 nor will
savings deposits at the bank level influence M2 at the aggregate level.  Therefore, M2 is exogenous to any
individual bank.  Housing inflation is the difference in FRED’s housing CPI data.
11 The banks’ State code is included to capture geographic differences in lending.
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Table 3A. Estimates for first-difference regression Equation 2: Dependent variable
islog total net lending (1990q1-2007q1)
Size categories “Small” “Lower medium” “Upper medium” “Large”




















Total Policy Effect for Selling
Banks at 1S.D. above mean











N 221,973 44,860 8,152 11,656
No. Banks 5,340 1,821 550 518
R2 0.104 0.042 0.078 0.025
***, **, * refers to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  White HCCM robust standard
errors.
Table 3B below addresses potential endogeneity bias in the panel autoregressive term by
using the second lag of differenced total loans as the external instrument for the first lag,
with lags two through four omitted. Otherwise, the specification is identical to that found in
Equation (2).
Table 3B. IV Estimates for dynamic panel first-difference regression equation 2:
dependent variable is log total net lending (1990q1-2007q1)
Size categories “Small” “Lower medium” “Upper medium” “Large”






























N 221,973 44,860 8,152 11,656
No. Banks 5,340 1,821 550 518
Root MSE 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.43
***, **, * refers to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, White HCCM robust standard
errors.
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As Tables 3A and 3B show, the sum of the impacts of lagged, differenced Federal Funds
rate (ΣΔFFR) is negative in all size groups. However, negative and significant coefficients
are observed for small and medium sized banks only. This is consistent with previous
studies [1,10] which find that an increase in the Federal Funds rate is associated with a
decline in loans for smaller banks only.
The sum of the coefficients on the interaction term, which includes the policy response for
banks that sell loans, (ΣΔHELD*ΔFFR) is negative and significant for only the two medium
size categories. For the lower-medium sized banks, the interaction coefficient sum is
negative and significant at the 10% level. For the upper-medium sized banks, the coefficient
sum is larger in absolute value, negative and significant at the 1% level. These results
suggest that medium sized banks which engage in loan sales will experience a larger
reduction in total loans following a monetary contraction, compared to an identical bank that
does not engage in loan sales. Likewise, the larger the magnitude of loan sale activity, the
larger the change in policy response. Note that the cumulative interaction effect is given for
only two quarters, as the significance of the impact dissipates beyond that point. This
negative cumulative coefficient on the second derivative interaction term is consistent with
the prediction of the simple balance sheet model.
To appreciate the magnitude of the estimated effect of loan sales on total lending response,
it is noted that the sample quarterly mean of ΔHELD for the selling banks within the $300M-
$500M size category is $494,000, with a standard deviation of $9,891,000. Thus, a bank
heavily engaged in loan sales at one standard deviation above the mean, the change in
response to a 100 basis point increase in the Federal Funds Rate over a six month period
will be ($10,385,000)*(-1.73e-06)= -.0179. Adding this to the estimated long run propensity
for ΔFFR gives the total effect of -.0259, or a 2.5% reduction in loan growth. Comparing this
response to that for non-selling banks (ΔHELD=0) of 0.0079, there is over a threefold
increase in sensitivity. The same calculation for the $100M-$300M category shows response
nearly doubles for heavily selling banks. The results are not reported for size categories
where the estimated interaction terms are not found to be significant. These results indicate
that the impact of monetary contraction on lending will be meaningfully larger for banks
engaged in loan sales.
It is also observed from Table 3 that for banks under $300M in real assets, there is a
negative and significant cumulative impact of loan sales on total loans held on the balance
sheet. Banks which reserve a greater value of loans for future sale have a smaller value of
loans on their balance sheet at a given point in time, indicating a smaller loan portfolio.
While this finding appears counter to that of [20], this discrepancy is very likely due to the
different nature of loan sale indicator used (potential securitization, as opposed to actual
loan sale accounts used here). A bank with greater securitization potential will, by definition,
own a larger value of liquid and salable loans.
A possible reason why a significant policy response differential is not observed for large
banks, even though they participate heavily in the loan sales market, is that large banks
have greater access to financial markets as informational asymmetries and agency costs are
lower. Instead of selling loans to buffer their balance sheet from a monetary shock, large
banks can simply raise alternate sources of funds compared to medium sized banks in
response to contractionary monetary policy. Further, large banks tend to focus on different
types of loans (e.g. commercial and industrial) compared to smaller banks (e.g. mortgages
and personal loans) which would respond differently to a monetary contraction.
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4. CONCLUSION
This study provides some new insight into bank behavior following a monetary policy shock.
The results suggest that although banks can theoretically use loan sales to buffer their
balance sheets against monetary policy shocks, not all banks do so. Evidence indicates that
medium sized banks sell loans in response to a monetary contraction, and results suggest
that banks use loan sales to buffer their balance sheets against monetary policy shocks by
providing liquidity. This has important implications for policy makers since many firms and
individuals are bank dependent and access to credit during a monetary contraction is
paramount to economic activity. If banks respond heterogeneously to monetary contractions,
one would also expect to see a heterogeneous response from bank dependent customers.
When medium sized banks are unable to sell loans to shore-up reserves resulting from a
monetary shock or to shore-up capital following a financial market shock, these banks may
be forced to restrict credit; one of many possible contributing factors of the 2008-09 credit
crunch.
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